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A B S T R A C T
As climate change policies and governance initiatives struggle to produce the transformational social
changes required, the search for stand out case studies continues. Many have pointed to the period
between 2005 and 2008 in the United Kingdom as a promising example of national level innovation. With
strong cross-party consensus and a ﬁrst-of-its-kind legislation the UK established itself as a climate
policy leader. However, early warning signs suggest that this institutionalised position is far from secure.
Through a novel application of discursive institutionalism this article presents a detailed analysis of the
role of ideas in unravelling this ambition under the Conservative-Liberal coalition administration (2010–
2015). Discursive interactions among policymakers and other political actors were dominated by ideas
about governmental responsibility and economic austerity, establishing an atmosphere of climate policy
scepticism and restraint. By situating this conspicuous and inﬂuential process of bricolage within its
institutional context the importance of how policymakers think and communicate about climate change
is made apparent. The power of ideas to inﬂuence policy is further demonstrated through their cognitive
and normative persuasiveness, by imposing over and excluding alternatives and in their institutional
positioning. It can be concluded that despite innovative legislation, institution building and strategic
coordination of different types of governance actors the ideational foundations of ambitious climate
change politics in the UK have been undermined.
ã 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Global environmental issues such as anthropogenic climate
change continue to be a signiﬁcant political agenda at multiple
levels, not least for nation states. As inter-, multi- and trans-
national environmental governance initiatives proliferate, the
domestic politics of climate change leaders (and laggards) has
become of wide interest (Andresen and Agrawala, 2002; Fank-
hauser et al., 2015; Liefferink et al., 2009; Schreurs and Tiberghien,
2007). In 2008, the United Kingdom (UK) government passed the
Climate Change Act (CCA), a ﬁrst-of-its-kind legislation legally
binding the UK to an ambitious greenhouse gas emission reduction
target of 80% of 1990 levels by 2050. The implications were
signiﬁcant, institutionalising climate change as a political issue
within the UK but also diffusing its ambition and policy framework
to other contexts (Gummer, 2014; Hill, 2009; cf. Pielke, Jr., 2009).
The political and institutional circumstances surrounding UK
climate politics and the CCA have since received a great deal of
attention (Bowen and Rydge, 2011; Carter, 2014; Carter and Jacobs,E-mail address: r.o.gillard@leeds.ac.uk (R. Gillard).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.06.012
0959-3780/ã 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article2014; Lockwood, 2013; Lorenzoni and Benson, 2014). This article
presents a critical and detailed analysis of changes in the way
climate change is thought about and discussed since that heyday.
Between 2010 and 2015 a Conservative-Liberal coalition govern-
ment was responsible for continuing this ambitious climate policy
agenda within the context of a global and national economic
recession. Given the tendency of policymakers to backtrack, or
stall, on previous commitments during difﬁcult political and
economic periods (Bauer et al., 2012; Howlett, 2014) this is a timely
moment to ask: what happens to the underlying ideas and does it
matter?
The Stern Review’s (Stern, 2007) presentation of early climate
change action as economically rational was pivotal in the UK case
(Carter and Jacobs, 2014). Also, the idea of ﬁve-yearly carbon
budgets to keep successive governments on track, and account-
able, to the 2050 target was important (Bows et al., 2006).
Discourses of low-carbon business opportunities, correcting
previous policy failures and a moral sense of urgency helped to
secure support from private actors, policymakers and civil society
respectively (Lorenzoni and Benson, 2014). Some of these ideas
and discourses were formally institutionalised in a government
Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and a semi- under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1 This typology echoes Hall’s (1993) corresponding three orders of policy change
but is deliberately more expansive, incorporating normative and non-scientiﬁc
ideas in its description of what constitutes the institutionalisation of a policy
arrangement.
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energy and climate goals became entangled through an increas-
ingly complex mix of instruments, discourses and strategies
designed to simultaneously achieve low-carbon, secure and
affordable energy—known as the ‘trilemma’ (Kern et al., 2014;
Rogers-Hayden et al., 2011).
Despite the formal nature of this institutionalisation, doubts
about its longevity have been raised (Lockwood, 2013), especially
as the ‘competitive consensus’ among political actors supporting it
quickly fell away after the 2010 national election (Carter, 2014). In
response to these warnings, and also to calls from climate policy
innovation scholars for more research into post-adoption com-
plexities (Jordan and Huitema, 2014), this article tracks the nature
and impact of subsequent changes in the ideas and discourses of
UK climate politics.
In Section 2 the merits of a constructivist approach to studying
political ideas and institutions are outlined. Section 3 summarises
the methodology and case study materials. Section 4 shows how
economic rationality and the normative positioning of government
remained important ideas but that their initial emphasis on early
action and leadership shifted under the strain of austerity. In light
of these ﬁndings Section 5 raises concerns about a consensus
approach to climate change politics and explores the political
institutional context in more detail. Section 6 concludes with
reﬂections on the analytical framework’s contribution to the study
of ideas in policy and the UK case study’s relevance for climate
change politics and governance in other contexts.
2. Ideas are more than just another variable
Political science, policy analysis and governance studies have all
increasingly sought to account for the importance of ideas and
discourse in shaping political processes (Fischer, 2003; Gofas and
Hay, 2010; Hajer and Versteeg, 2005; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003;
Kütting and Lipschutz, 2012; Yanow, 2000). This critical turn can be
seen in prominent theories of the policy process where only a
handful of staunchly empiricist approaches continue to ignore or
black box issues of subjectivity (Cairney, 2011; Sabatier, 2007).
Reactionary attempts have been made to incorporate ideas as one
more controllable variable within a positivist philosophy of science
(regarding policy see: Pawson, 2006) so as to ‘not have to swallow
the contaminated epistemological water of postmodernism in
order to enjoy the heady ontological wine of constructivism’
(Keohane, 2000: 129). However, far from treating ideas as free-
ﬂoating epiphenomena, many constructivists have explicitly
linked them to traditional political entities such as institutions,
interests and policy change (Béland and Cox, 2011; Hajer, 1996).
The implication of only partially considering ideas is apparent
in some of the research on environmental policy innovations and
institutions mentioned above. For example, Patashnik (2008) and
Pierson (2004) both subsume the role of ideas under an
explanation of politics as path-dependent, thereby failing to fully
grasp their diversity and potential for driving change. However,
these political realist accounts tell us little about the ideational and
discursive processes through which these actors interact and
through which climate policies are enacted or undermined. To
illustrate, Lorenzoni and Benson (2014) compare such an approach
with the more constructivist discursive institutionalism (DI)
framework, demonstrating the latter’s ability to explain the
inﬂuence of climate economics ideas and the discursive inter-
actions among civil society, politicians and business leaders that
produced near unanimous support for the CCA.
This article extends the application of a constructivist approach,
and DI in particular, to present a comprehensive account of how
ideas and discourse have continued to shape UK climate politics
over time. Accordingly ideas and discourse are treated as particularforms of power and political processes differentiated from, but
interrelated with, other forms such as laws, institutions and
structures. Within the language of DI, Carstensen and Schmidt
(2015: 4) deﬁne ideational power as ‘the capacity of actors
(whether individual or collective) to inﬂuence actors' normative
and cognitive beliefs’. This is done through three observable
processes: the persuasion to accept and adopt certain views (power
through ideas), the imposition of ideas and exclusion of alternatives
(power over ideas), and the production of subject positions as well
as the constraining of what can be legitimately considered (power
in ideas) (ibid.). Given this analytical depth the intention is not to
simply claim that ‘idea A caused policy B’ but to offer a more
qualitative account of how ideational elements affect the way
actors interpret, inﬂuence and enact climate policy.
2.1. Rethinking institutionalised ideas
Adopting a broadly Habermasian understanding of discourse as
communicative action (Habermas et al., 1990) DI focuses on the
interactions between actors and the ideas they carry, thereby
reducing the emphasis on entrenched formal structures found in
other schools of institutionalist thought. This sensitivity to
interpersonal dynamics makes it a suitable framework for
analysing the post-adoption politics of the CCA, where policy-
makers and other actors begin to negotiate their preferred
pathways towards implementation. It is in these personal and
micro-political exchanges that climate policy ideas are re-formed,
supporting or disrupting the achievement of long-term targets.
Following Schmidt (2008, 2010) the analytical components of
DI can be clearly deﬁned to produce a framework incorporating
ideas, discourses and institutions (see Table 1). Ideas fall across
three levels ranging from implicit values (philosophy) to general
assumptions or principles (program) and speciﬁc solutions
(policy).1 For example, hidden social norms as well as more
explicit assumptions about the scientiﬁc, economic or cultural
nature of climate change are all as important as the practical
actions of risk assessments and carbon budgeting. Further, two
types of overarching ideas are particularly adept at tying together
these three levels: normative ideas that provide prescriptions by
linking values to appropriate courses of action and cognitive ideas
that guide analysis by appealing to prevalent logics and interests.
Put simply, discourse refers to the ‘exchange of ideas’ among
actors (Schmidt, 2011: 56). These interactions take a variety of
forms (e.g. myths, stories, and scenarios) but their common goal is
to represent ideas. There are two types of discursive interaction:
coordination among actors responsible for developing policy and
communication between these actors and other, less centrally
placed, political stakeholders. The relative importance and
inﬂuence of these types of discourse is partially determined by
the institutional context. In a simple, or uniﬁed, polity communi-
cative discourse will be most prominent as policy actors make
decisions centrally and then seek to justify them whereas in a
compound, or dispersed, governance context coordinative dis-
course is more pronounced as multiple actors are involved
throughout the policy process. Lastly, the particulars of the
institutional context (e.g. expected logics, patterns and audiences)
need to be adequately addressed by ideas and discourses if they are
to be inﬂuential.
Having been applied in numerous policy areas at national and
international levels DI has become established alongside, but also
Table 1
DI concept deﬁnitions and examples of their applicability to the case study.
Concept Deﬁnition Application
Ideas Level Philosophy—rarely explicit or contested ideas, values, principles and
knowledge.
Links between (political) ideology and climate change.
Program—assumptions and organising principles that deﬁne the
problem and its solutions.
Debates within government about how to deﬁne and respond to
climate change.
Policy—speciﬁc solutions to speciﬁc problems. The CCA, carbon budgets and related policies.
Type Normative—connect the three levels by referring to values and
appropriateness.
How UK climate politics challenges or conforms to social
expectations.
Cognitive—connect the three levels by appealing to prevalent logic and
interests.
The rationalities of science, economics, politics, culture etc.
Discourses Representation Via multiple forms—narratives, myths, frames, collective memories,
stories, scripts, scenarios, images etc.
How climate change is presented in the UK and how this shapes
the message.
Interaction Coordination—among policy actors to: create, elaborate and justify. The mediating role of entrepreneurs and the allegiances of
different actors.
Communication—among political actors to: present, deliberate and
legitimize.
Strategies, media coverage, public engagement and the
transmission of messages about climate change.
Institutions Form Simple—uniﬁed governance. Climate policymaking at Parliament and its style of engagement
with other actors throughout the process.Compound—dispersed governance.
Speciﬁcs Convincing messages follow expected patterns, are logical and are
pitched at the right audiences in the right ideational setting.
How climate ideas and discourses differ within government and
how they interact with their institutional setting.
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variants of institutionalism (see: Bell, 2012; Peters, 2011; Schmidt,
2010). Perhaps the most obvious and popularising difference is its
emphasis on change rather than stability. By stressing the dynamic,
as opposed to deterministic, nature of institutions DI has leant
itself almost exclusively to studies of moments of change
(although: Hope and Raudla, 2012). Ironically, unless more
longitudinal studies are undertaken, this may serve to reinforce
the view of the policy process as sequential and equilibrium
seeking i.e. there is stability, then a radical change that is studied in
detail, then a return to stability.
In order to increase the DI framework’s sensitivity to
incremental changes, the notion of ideational bricolage as
theorised by Carstensen (2011) can be instructive. Herein ideas
are understood as being comprised of a web or related elements of
meaning whose presence, linkages, and relative importance is
prone to change over time. These mutations are incremental
enough to be overlooked, or even deliberately downplayed, but
their cumulative effect and inﬂuence on policy can be signiﬁcant
(ibid). By combining this with Schmidt’s equally dynamic
conceptualisation of ideas and institutions it becomes possible
to see how the different elements of meaning contained withine2
1t
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Fig. 1. A representation of ideas as a changing web of related elements of meaning, si
Adapted from Carstensen (2011).normative and cognitive ideas are situated and evolving across
three levels.
In Fig. 1 overarching cognitive/normative ideas are represented
as being comprised of smaller ideas spanning the three levels.
Reinterpreting these as a web of elements of meaning enables a
more detailed description of their linkages and stability/changes.
For example, over time from t1 to t2, a given element may stay the
same (e1), its relative prominence may change (e2 shrinks), or it
may be completely replaced by an alternative (e3 becomes e4).
Mapping this web onto the three levels of DI offers a useful
typology for deﬁning the elements of meaning and showing their
distribution.
3. Methods
Discourse analysis was carried out on transcripts from a set of
original interviews carried out between May and September 2015.
In order to address the research questions most efﬁciently
interviewees were selected for their close proximity to UK climate
policymaking and politics circa 2008–2015. In line with the DI
framework interviewees were purposively selected for their status
as either policy actors (involved in designing and elaboratinge2
e4
e1
2t
y
tuated across the three levels of DI.
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and legitimising policies). Following Yanow (2000), individuals
from different types of organisations regularly involved in climate
policy and politics were recruited to ensure a representative range
of perspectives (see Table 2). Interviews with such policy élites are
a useful and valid tool for analysing otherwise hard to reach
aspects of the political process such as decision makers’ beliefs and
values (Beamer, 2002). Given the exclusive nature of policy
networks a critical snowball recruitment method (Noy, 2008) was
used, relying on the notion of ‘reputation’ to recruit key individuals
(Farquharson, 2005). To avoid reverting to a narrow deﬁnition of
reputation as merely authoritative, interviewees were also asked
to consider ‘thought leaders’, prominent non-state actors, and
individuals with insightful positions.
Transcripts were analysed for evidence of types of ideas,
accounts of discursive interactions and descriptions of institutional
contexts. This approach was applied to the interviewees’ explicit
accounts as well as to their more implicit and indirect utterances
(e.g. underlying philosophical principles and assumptions). In
other words, texts were analysed for both their content and
function as meaning-making discourses. The same analytical
approach was applied to relevant publically available documentary
data sources (e.g. policy documents, government reports, public
statements, and media articles) thereby enabling a triangulation of
the ﬁndings. Although the emphasis of DI and this article is on
interactions between actors and thus on verbal accounts, docu-
ments were particularly illustrative with regards to communica-
tive discourses. Here texts were primarily treated as discursive
practices intended to present and legitimise certain ideas about
climate change through policy.
4. Shift in the institutionalisation of climate change ideas
Prior to the general election in 2010 climate change had rapidly
risen in political salience internationally and in the UK. Described
as a ‘punctuated equilibrium’, this attention to environmental
politics and the risk of dangerous impacts from climate change
highlighted the inadequacy of existing policies to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions (Carter and Jacobs, 2014; Lorenzoni
and Benson, 2014). Spurred on by private sector endorsement of
the business case for a low-carbon economy and a vociferous civil
society campaign UK politicians engaged in a ‘competitive
consensus’ to adopt a world-leading climate policy framework
in 2008 (Carter, 2014). However, as the recession dragged on and
political attention turned away from climate change – especially
after the 2010 election – the cost of implementing climate policies
became a contentious issue (Carter, 2014; Ares, 2011). As LockwoodTable 2
Interviewees’ information.
Organisation type Role 
Policy actors
Central Government Politicians, advisers and committee me
Civil service Senior strategists and policy ofﬁcials in
economics
Political actors
Non-Governmental Organisations (pressure
groups)
Senior analysts and knowledge brokers
international development
Media Senior editors and journalists covering
Think tank Senior advisers, consultants and know
Private sector Consultants working with private and 
Academia Senior academics researching climate c(2013) has suggested, the political sustainability of the CCA began
to look less assured. Changes to the types of ideas and discourses
associated with climate policy between 2010 and 2015 are a key
indicator of this uncertainty and its effects on future efforts to
reduce emissions.
4.1. Elements of meaning across three levels
4.1.1. Philosophy
Given the dominance of neoliberalism and deregulation in UK
politics it is perhaps unsurprising that the philosophical level of
ideas was populated with concerns about the failure of a
centralised form of government to address the physical and social
reality of climate change. Whilst not shared by all, these concerns
were part of a wider modernist trust in the potential of
technological innovation and economic liberalism to provide
solutions. Similarly, the failure of any mainstream political
ideology to convincingly relate to, and articulate, the social
complexity of climate change was also mentioned. For example,
one interviewee noted reluctance among the political élite to
confront ‘the confusing and incoherent fragments of postmodern
politics’ (CS1), suggesting that most intuitively attempt to
depoliticise climate change whenever possible.
Overall, the majority of ideas identiﬁed were programmatic,
with some being linked to speciﬁc policy solutions such as setting
carbon budgets and conducting risk assessments. Broadly speaking
they followed a logic of either 1) climate change is X and therefore
governing it requires Y or 2) climate policies are bad/good for the
economy. Already this suggests a predominance of political and
economic, rather than social or cultural, rationalities for addressing
climate change. At a general level this is an example of power in
ideas, or the institutionalisation of certain ways of thinking that
requires policymakers to base decisions on technical forms of
evidence.
4.1.2. Program
Based on a belief in neoclassical rational-actor principles the
ﬁrst set of ideas often deﬁned climate change as the archetypal
‘tragedy of the commons’ writ large. Assumptions about the need
for top-down targets and principles of good governance were quick
to follow. Whilst common, this view was often accompanied by a
resigned acceptance that there has been a rapid loss of political
appetite for state intervention. For instance, climate policymakers
felt their range of options to be signiﬁcantly curtailed by the newly
introduced Better Regulations Framework (BIS, 2013), another
example of the exclusionary power of ideas. The new guidance
applied to all government ofﬁcials and institutionalised a ‘one-inCode Total
mbers involved in climate change, energy and economics PM 7
volved in international and domestic climate change, energy and CS 4
 representing stakeholders in climate change action and NGO 3
 climate change, energy and the environment EJ 3
ledge brokers involved in climate change, politics and energy TT 3
public sectors on climate change and energy PS 2
hange, energy and politics and energy policy in Europe A 3
Subtotal:
25
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regulation as a purely negative burden’ (PM5). In practice this
means ﬂagship climate regulations and taxes were signiﬁcantly
weakened, as in the cases of the Emissions Performance Standard
for fossil fuel power generators which ‘was completely neutered’
(PS1) during its development, and also the Carbon Price Support
policy which was frozen within a year of being introduced (HMRC,
2014).
Second, the economics of climate change remained a provider
of best practice principles for climate policy. Central to this set of
ideas is the cost-beneﬁt ratio argument made by the Stern Review,
stressing the cost effectiveness of early mitigation action (Stern,
2007). Among policymakers a shorthand heuristic for these ideas
was the principle of ‘maximum return on investment’, which was
favourably seen as helping government to function more like a
business and as wholly sensible given the adage that government
never has enough money to do everything it wants to. By late 2014
the long-term relationship between the economy and climate
change had not been invalidated but had been replaced by the
more politically salient short-term relationship between the
economy and re-election.
4.1.3. Policy
Relying mostly on economic assumptions many climate
policymakers, including ministers at DECC and the Department
for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) continued to try and
bolster this early action imperative – citing positive feedbacks,
investor conﬁdence and infrastructure development as part of a
long-term plan – but ultimately the short-term demands of saving
public money eclipsed them. The overbearing presence of austerity
even led policymakers to actively avoid some solutions; being told
directly that ‘if it costs money it isn’t going to happen’ (PM1). More
than just the coercive power over ideas embodied in the Treasury’s
ability to veto policy suggestions, the austerity agenda created a
restrictive atmosphere within which policymakers pre-emptively
excluded certain ideas based on an internalised assumption that
only efﬁciency gains and ‘doing more with less’ types of policies
would be deemed viable. Whilst the range of speciﬁc solutions for
reducing emissions was dwindling policymakers were able toPhilosophy
Correcng 
failures
Leadership
Beneﬁts
Danger
Moral
8002
Target seng
Program
Policy
Fig. 2. Changes in prominence of, and links between, elempoint towards carbon budgets and risk assessments as evidence of
their continued – albeit strategic or even symbolic – actions on
tackling climate change.
4.2. Weaving a convincing web of meanings
4.2.1. Losing the normative mandate to lead
Around the time of the CCA (2005–2008) a strong normative
position for the UK as a climate leader emerged. This was based on
a moral imperative to act urgently in the face of dangerous climate
impacts and to reap the beneﬁts of correcting hitherto failed
policies (Lorenzoni and Benson, 2014). Since then, these elements
of meaning have signiﬁcantly diminished and been joined by
others to produce a shift in the overarching normative idea about
the government’s role in tackling climate change (see Fig. 2).
As predicted by Carter (2014), the sense of urgency and
momentum associated with the Big Ask civil society campaign and
the competitive consensus among politicians dissipated after the
national election. The prominence of morally-based ideas also
shrank due to previously abstract notions of dangerous impacts
being redeﬁned as speciﬁc manageable risks (see Fig. 2) via the UK
Climate Change Risk Assessment programme and policies (DEFRA,
2012). However, thanks to deep-seated democratic values of
governmental duty and accountability this norm didn’t dissipate
entirely. The idea of target setting also remained, enabling
politicians to point to the ﬂagship CCA policy and carbon budgets
when challenged with critiques or when positioning the UK as a
climate leader on the international stage.
Two new additions to the milieu of meanings fundamentally
altered the way the idea of leadership could be expressed. As
climate change’s political salience waned the meaning of leader-
ship became more about acting responsibly than seeking out ﬁrst-
mover opportunities. As a result, the direct beneﬁts of mitigation
and adaptation were no longer enough to justify action, there
needed to be co-beneﬁts too. One policy actor recalled:
‘We couldn’t just do it [climate change] for the sake of it; we had to
make up an argument as well.’ (PM5)
Further, whatever the size of the mandate to act on climate
change, its appropriate expression needed to be as decentralised asLeadership
Big Society
Co-beneﬁts
Risk
Moral
5102
Risk 
assessment
Target seng
ents of the normative idea of UK climate governance.
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(Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2010), which extolled the innovative problem-
solving potential of shared responsibility and non-state actor
empowerment. Previously civil society and industry had vocifer-
ously pressurised government to lead but they were now being
asked what they were going to do.
4.2.2. Whose numbers count most?
Economics continued to be the most prevalent cognitive idea
through which to grapple with the complexity of the climate-
society relationship. For instance, in successive reports and
recommendations to Parliament the Committee on Climate
Change (e.g. 2008, 2010, 2013) deployed economic analyses to
directly appeal to: the perceived long-term vision of politicians
seeking to leave a legacy, publics concerned with infrastructure
investment and low-carbon enterprises looking for a stable
business trajectory. However, through the adjustment of metrics
and assumptions economic logic can be coherently applied in
support of very different policy recommendations. This is an
epistemological situation that policymakers were acutely aware of
and which was built into their political strategies:
‘You’ve got three departments [DECC, BIS, Treasury] all doing
analysis on the same questions just because they don’t trust each
other. For example, the Treasury focused more on short-term values
and so off-shore wind was hated whereas DECC saw it as a gamble
for the future.’ (PM4)
As austerity loomed large, economic discourses began to paint a
different picture to the one presented by the Stern Review.
Concerns were raised about reducing public spending, protecting
energy intensive industries and maintaining competitiveness with
the rest of Europe. In 2013/14 arguments around reviewing the
fourth Carbon Budget presented a visible example of these
competing rationales. A chorus of support to be as ambitious as
economically possible swept through the ﬁrst three carbon
budgets (in 2008) but, in contrast, adopting the fourth (in 2011)
required a direct intervention from the Prime Minister and the
addition of several caveats including a chance to review and revisePhilosoph
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Fig. 3. Changes in prominence of, and links between, elemeit. Although it was ultimately upheld this challenge to the validity
of the fourth carbon budget, and the CCC’s advice more generally,
has set a precedent for future caveats and reviews of ambition.
From the policymakers’ perspective (self-labelled as pragmat-
ic), pursuing long-term climate goals and low-carbon investment
was overtaken by the imminent and interdependent need to repair
the economy and get re-elected. In political terms this led to
prioritising the interests of consumers/voters over those of the
low-carbon sector e.g. reducing energy prices by cutting subsidy
levies. In simple economic terms the discount rate proposed by
Stern for calculating cost-beneﬁt ratios into the future was rapidly
adjusted to favour the present. Or, to put it another way, the
political economy of climate change ideas went from prioritising
long-term diffused beneﬁts to being primarily about short-term
concentrated costs (see Fig. 3).
4.2.3. Normative and cognitive cross-over and other ideas
Overall the various elements of meaning spanned all three
levels of ideas in much the way that Schmidt (2010) anticipated.
That is, with very little explicit reference to philosophical level
values (e.g. political philosophy or ideology), and an abundance of
programmatic level organising principles (e.g. leadership, target
setting, markets and subsidies). It is also important to note that
developments in the cognitive and normative ideas described
above did not happen in isolation from alternatives or from each
other. For instance, arguably accelerating the decline of a
government leadership norm was the resurgence of the powerful
cognitive idea of scepticism. Although climate science scepticism
had become a marginalised position the more moderate and
politically acceptable position of ‘climate luke warmism’ – that is,
accepting the science but doubting the likelihood of severe impacts
– emerged. When coupled with the belief that government
intervention is inefﬁcient in areas of unpredictability or long-term
planning this amounted to a form of ‘climate policy sceptism’.
Further, the notion of co-beneﬁts appears in both types of ideas
suggesting it to be a pertinent and malleable element; for instance
several policy and political actors saw it as vital for keeping climatey
5102
Cost Co-beneﬁts
Macro economy
Austerity
Carbo n 
budgets
nts of the cognitive idea of climate change economics.
Table 3
Discursive interactions and their institutional context.
Discourses Contexts
High-level commitments to climate change such as target setting were generally supported but detailed and potentially divisive decisions
were seen as the responsibility of more decentralised processes and actors.
Central Government
Positive and long-term economics backed up policy decisions and linked them to high-level targets but this was hampered due to
inconsistency caused by competing policy goals and Coalition politics.
DECC policy
The economics of emissions reductions and the science of climate risks were the foundations for long-term planning but were incongruent
with dominant ideas about neoliberal governance and austerity.
CCC consultations
Austerity, small government, and climate science luke warmism produced an atmosphere of climate policy scepticism. Treasury negotiations
Leadership through cross-party consensus building and appealing to positive investment storylines. NGO and think tank
engagement
Uncertainty was a central theme for both low carbon and industrial actors as they appealed to policymakers for consistent economic signals
and policies.
Private sector statements
32 R. Gillard / Global Environmental Change 40 (2016) 26–36goals on the government’s agenda and as the only possible way to
secure political and economic resources during the recession.
4.3. Turning down the volume on climate change discourse
Despite speaking with a range of different actors, ideas about
climate change appeared in a limited number of discursive forms.
In the policy sphere, meteorological and economic scenario
modelling was treated as the foundation of climate change
knowledge. Repetitive policy scripts about tackling the energy
trilemma and abating risk were then used to explain what was
being done. Even among wider political actors and stakeholders
these forms were the most prominent. Though in addition, there
were some polarised protagonist/antagonist driven narratives
recurring in the media that functioned more as awareness raising
devices than as a means of elaborating or deliberating responses to
climate change. Given the evidence base and its focus on public
policy (where scientiﬁc and economic evidence-based justiﬁca-
tions and good versus bad plotlines are known to resonate loudest)
this narrow range of discursive representations is perhaps
unsurprising.
4.3.1. A Consensus built on shallow foundations
The day-to-day political interactions within, and along the
fringes of, government are such that a summary of these discursive
practices can only ever be a snapshot. As has been shown,
discourses of climate governance and economics were continu-
ously present, although not necessarily stable, over time. They
often produced boundary work2 (e.g. annual reports, scenario
models and framework policies) to help coordinate different types
of actors around a particular set of ideas. A mixture of ideational
coherence, strategic enactment and institutional context mediated
their ability to coordinate actors around speciﬁc ideas. Table 3 lists
some examples of the discourses used by interviewees to elaborate
and justify their preferred policy options as well as the institutional
context in which they were deployed and debated with various
actors. Whilst they are not exhaustive or entirely representative
these examples do provide insights into common themes and the
importance of institutional venues and the ideas that permeate
their boundaries.
Notwithstanding more detailed disagreements, the CCC and
DECC consistently aligned behind an overarching discourse of
positive climate economics and necessary government involve-
ment. Generally, support for this position from politicians was
unreliable. Cabinet ministers and party leaders were keen to
engage in high-level rhetoric e.g. around approving the fourth
c-
a-
r-
2 Based on Gieryn’s (1983) original description of the way knowledge can be used
to demarcate areas of expertise for ideological reasons.bon budget and signing a ‘joint pledge’ during the 2015 election to
remain committed to tackling climate change. However, they were
not so forthcoming on speciﬁc climate policy solutions that could
drive a rapid low-carbon transition such as a power sector
decarbonisation target or domestic energy efﬁciency. In the case of
the latter, underperforming policies (e.g. the Green Deal) resulted
in a big setback to the UK’s attainment of long-term emissions
reductions (CCC, 2014).
Both of the CCC Chairmen (Lord Turner, previously Director
General of the Chamber of British Industry and then Lord Deben,
previously Chairman of the Conservative Party) were able to keep
potentially hostile business leaders and Conservative politicians on
side. Similarly, the two Secretaries of State at DECC (Chris Huhne
and then Ed Davey) fought effectively to make the economic case
for climate change a more visible priority and enlisted the help of
other departments (e.g. working with BIS to establish the Green
Investment Bank) to mainstream climate goals across government.
Despite these coordinative efforts the persuasive power of climate
change economics had limitations. For instance, a signiﬁcant
countervailing pressure came from the Treasury who took an
increasingly hostile stance toward climate policies, occasionally
aligning with anti-regulation politicians and high carbon industry
actors. This coordination was built around a salient counter-
discourse of climate policy as expensive but also politically
dispensable  succinctly expressed in the Prime Minister’s often
quoted dictum to ‘get rid of the green crap’ (Schoﬁeld, 2013).
Here the importance of institutional constraint/enabling is
particularly clear. First, DECC struggled to reconcile internal
inconsistencies to do with both policy (trilemma goals) and
politics (as a Liberal Democrat led department in a Conservative
majority coalition). Second, the CCC was formally mandated to
provide advice based on scientiﬁc and economic rationalities only.
Whilst their reports were well received by most type of actors they
were restricted in their ability to engage in overtly political, and
therefore potentially more effective, coordinative discourses. And
thirdly the Treasury, due to its institutional position as ﬁscal
overseer and the pervasive discourse of reducing public spending,
was able to occupy a contrary position vis-à-vis ambitious climate
policy without fear of being isolated or losing inﬂuence. As one
interviewee quipped:
‘If you work for the Treasury it is your job to be disliked so we
should be reasonably understanding, but they have been
increasingly overreaching.’ (TT5)
4.3.2. Telling a compelling non-story
It is important to note that the communicative interactions
analysed here took place among actors with special interest in
climate change but who felt that it commanded little attention or
value in wider society. In fact, many actors – including central
government and media – deﬁned climate change as a ‘non-story’
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a clear example of one idea’s power over the alternative view that
climate change could be an important political issue. Not only did
this limit the overall amount of communicative discourse but it
also steered what little there was towards a particular view of
climate change as just another issue among many rather than as
something cross-cutting and fundamental.
Six communicative discourses and the way they deliberated
and legitimised certain climate programs or policies were
identiﬁed (see Table 4). Again, governance and economics ideas
were prominent throughout. Emerging out of this assortment were
two competing meta-discourses: 1) the UK is leading on climate
change through a long-term and positive economic plan, contra 2)
disagreement over energy and budget priorities is undermining
the UK’s response to climate change.
The UK’s leadership role in climate change governance lost its
public appeal quickly after 2008, retaining relevance only for a
fairly narrow set of actors engaged in international climate
negotiations at the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC). A telling sign of its diminished inﬂuence
was the relative absence of climate change from the electoral
campaigns in 2015, especially given their coincidence with a
milestone UNFCCC conference of the parties in Paris (COP21). In
fact, by signing a joint pledge, party leaders were able to gloss over
the fact that recent policy changes had knocked the UK off course
to achieving its longer-term targets (CCC, 2014).
Long-term planning and positive climate economics were
central pillars of DECC’s communication strategy and were spelled
out narratively through the language of carbon budgets, transition
pathways and renewable energy roadmaps (e.g. DECC, 2009, 2011a,
2011b). However, policymakers reported getting little traction
beyond the usual low-carbon sector ﬁrms and environmental
NGOs. Controlling the policy message is a vital form of power over
ideas for central government but one that was largely unsuccessful
in this case. Instead, aided by messages from the Treasury, some
media organisations and climate policy sceptics reverted to a
simpliﬁed economy-environment trade-off characterisation in
order to cast doubt on the government’s capacity to stay the
course as a climate leader during constrained economic times.
Open calls from policymakers for a complete rethink of the UK’s
leadership position and the CCA were few and far between (See
speeches by: Osborne, 2011; Patterson, 2014). Indeed, post-
legislative scrutiny conducted in 2013 (DECC, 2013) broadly
reafﬁrmed the government’s commitment to its level of ambition.
However, a more measured but no less damaging discursive
challenge to the 2008 consensus did gain ground. Climate policy
sceptics within government were quick to amplify disagreements
with the help of the media’s tendency to condense complex issues
into combative shorthand storylines e.g. by leaking letters showing
disagreement between ministers over the fourth carbon budget
(Stratton, 2011). Similarly, a complex set of policy instruments had
been developed to reﬂect the energy trilemma’s goals but muchTable 4
Communicative discourses and the climate related ideas they sought to express.
Discourse Summary
UK as leader Government has a responsibility to pursue ﬁrst mover advantages a
Long-term plan Target setting and the ﬂexible use of policy levers can cope with the
impacts that reach beyond political cycles.
Positive
economics
Climate change is an investment opportunity that brings co-beneﬁ
Dissensus The complexity of climate change demands more rigorous politica
Energy
transition
Subsidies and energy market signals can address climate goals but o
Budgeting Reducing public expenditure is a top priority therefore climate pocommunicative discourse ignored these details, focusing instead
on net public expenditure and green levies, thereby pitting DECC
against the Treasury, consumers against environmentalists and
politicians against their constituents’ least favourite energy
sources.
4.4. Institutional complexity and logical inconsistency
Interacting with these shifts in ideas and discourses were the
political institutions responsible for climate policy and governance
more generally. Elsewhere the UK parliamentary system has been
described as a ‘simple’ polity, meaning that the uniﬁed adminis-
tration requires a relatively small amount of coordinative
interactions to reach a decision before putting most effort into
communicating their justiﬁcations to the wider public and
stakeholders (Schmidt, 2010). Yet, several ﬁndings from this study
suggest this description to be inaccurate. First is the drive towards
devolution. The devolved administrations of Wales, Scotland and
Northern Ireland – as well as sub-national city regions – have
varying degrees of autonomy over their climate change programs
and policies, often outperforming and contradicting those
espoused in England. Secondly, inter-departmental factions were
exacerbated both by the need to integrate climate goals and by
Conservative-Liberal coalition dynamics. Thus the coordinative
activities and evidence gathering, or environmental policy
boundary work (Guston, 2001), of Junior Ministers, Select
Committees, All Party Parliamentary Groups and Special Advisers
increased signiﬁcantly. Lastly were the complementary trends
toward multi-actor governance, open policymaking and the
mediatisation of politics (Hajer, 2009). Together they demanded
more pluralistic coordination around climate change issues and
undermined the authority of didactic state driven messages. Taken
together such discord calls into question past claims about the
institutionalisation of climate change in the UK:
‘We have some climate legislation and a lot of climate related
policy zooming around that Westminster bubble. But I don’t think
the UK has ever had a position on climate change. I don’t think we
have a polity in the sense of a public conversation that is a true
reﬂection of our society. There is the Westminster bubble, which
has rather hijacked the public conversation, but I wouldn’t call that
a polity.’ (CS1)
Further, there were concerns about the inability of various
political and governance institutions’ ability to adequately express,
let alone respond to, the social complexities of climate change. The
ideas of 2005–2008 about cross-sector and cross-party consensus
in pursuit of ambitious climate goals proved, over time, to be
incompatible with several entrenched institutional logics. In policy
terms, the logic of neoliberalism continued to snub regulatory
options while at the same time the logic of ‘the Treasury View’ – an
example of power in ideas institutionalised since the 1930s
recession, asserting that government spending offers no netnd inﬂuence other actors to address public good problems such as climate change.
 uncertainties of climate change and are necessary for dealing with the long-term
ts and political capital.
l debate and a decentralised, market-driven approach to governance.
nly if consumers are protected from signiﬁcant costs and supplies remain secure.
licies should be discussed in terms of efﬁciency and return on investment.
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ﬁscal options regardless of how generously climate economists
discounted the future. In political terms, the cognitive power of
heuristic – as opposed to holistic – thinking in government quickly
returned climate change to its position as a background and non-
voter issue. In this context consensus without competition is
tantamount to depoliticisation, as one climate policymaker
recalled:
‘If you are not seen to be having a ﬁght about something then it is
not seen as being politically signiﬁcant. We got some attention
around the Spending Review but interest in the run of the mill
[climate policy] pieces was already waning when we came in [in
2010].’ (PM5)
5. Discussion: the power of ideas and their impact on climate
politics
More than just identifying and describing various ideas about
climate change, the ﬁndings have illustrated their linkages, relative
prominence and alterations over time. The generalised norm of
government responsibility for acting on climate change remained
but was diminished, losing the positive leadership emphasis and
failing to connect to either political philosophies or to speciﬁc
policies (Fig. 2). As the 2015 general election grew nearer climate
economics ideas shifted from investment and beneﬁts to austerity
and costs, replacing policy prescriptions for low-carbon sector
prioritisation with wider economic co-beneﬁts (Fig. 3). The power
of ideas, as theorised by Carstensen and Schmidt (2015) was also
clearly evident throughout. Coordinative interactions among
policy actors relied on the persuasive power through ideas of
economics, with institutionalised government divisions and
austerity ultimately overriding climate policy commitments.
Two types of power over ideas were apparent in the communicative
interactions of actors: the exclusion of climate change as a central
political story and the inability of central government to control,
and thus impose, coherent climate policy messages. Lastly, the
institutionalised power in ideas of economic rationality was further
strengthened by the recession, leaving the Treasury and neoliberal
governance advocates in a strong position to veto many climate
policy ideas.
As economic recession and the election cycle wore on
politicians appeared to revert to the meta-preference of ‘re-
election at all costs’ that Bauer and Knill (2012) warn about in their
work on policy dismantling. Combining these ﬁndings with the
observed trends in public and media engagement with climate
change in the UK and around the world (Boykoff et al., 2015) have
conﬁrmed Lockwood’s suspicion that despite occasional peaks (e.g.
the Big Ask campaign in 2008) there is insufﬁcient pressure from
voters to ensure politicians will shoulder the responsibility for
addressing climate change as a stand-alone public good. It is
perhaps not surprising then that environmental NGOs expended
great effort in coordinating a joint pledge from the three main
party leaders (Green Alliance, 2015) that simply restated previous
commitments.
Whilst this strategy of cross-party consensus building may be
based on theoretical (Giddens, 2009; Voß et al., 2009) and
experiential (Carter, 2014) foundations, there is reason to suggest
that it may not always be the most effective. Several interviewees
expressed dismay at the lack of ambition and its inadvertent
reinforcement of the idea of climate change as a ‘non-story’—even
during an election campaign period. However, this is not to
suggest that the other extreme of polarised climate politics would
be any more effective – witness the slow progress on climate
change of the United States administrations – but that a certain
degree of contestation is necessary to limit the scope fordismantling or inaction. A more moderate and pragmatic strategy
of exercising power over policymakers by highlighting slow
progress at a time of high accountability and visibility may be
effective. Despite the previous success of this strategy in 2008, few
voices referred to evidence that policy changes under the Coalition
Government were undermining longer-term emissions reductions
(CCC, 2014).
The cognitive idea of climate change economics moved in the
opposite direction with regards to politicisation. The positioning of
its component meanings changed very little (see Fig. 3) but the
switching from investment to austerity as an underlying principle
and the associated shift of emphasis from beneﬁts to costs
threatened the validity of certain policy ideas e.g. green energy
subsidies and the levying powers of DECC. The impact of these
tensions on climate policymaking was signiﬁcant; reductions in
the generosity of renewable energy subsidies were made in 2011
and Parliament contradicted CCC advice about setting a decarbon-
isation target for the power sector in 2013; both of which have
hampered progress towards emissions reductions in a key sector.
The review of the fourth carbon budget evidence base in 2014 was
an example of policymakers outwardly questioning the wisdom of
the CCC both in terms of its programmatic assumptions and policy
solutions. A precedent has thus been set for Parliament to revisit its
carbon budget commitments on economic competition grounds,
potentially jeopardising the attainment of its targets. Overall, it
appears the battle to persuade through the power of economic
ideas was won by those presenting a view of climate policy as too
costly and thus incompatible with deﬁcit reduction and, by
extension, re-election.
The case study ﬁndings are a reminder of the ideational
inﬂuence of economics as a rationale for governing (Flyvbjerg,
2001). Particularly important was its cognitive role throughout the
policy process (e.g. for visioning a future low-carbon economy and
guiding decision making based on the principle of maximum
return on investment) and the institutional positioning of
economists (e.g. Treasury control over DECC’s levying activity
and the appointment of economically-oriented leaders at DECC
and the CCC). This ‘political inﬂuence of economics’ (Hirschman
and Berman, 2014) is not inherently counterproductive to climate
change action – as the Stern Review (2007) proved – but it does
limit the range of policy solutions that can be considered. This
latter point is linked to concerns about the increasingly
technocratic nature of climate and energy policy in the UK,
especially regarding its negative effect on the political capacity of
policymakers (Kuzemko, 2015).
6. Conclusion
Starting from the assumption that a prolonged economic
recession would challenge the foundations of the UK’s ambitious
plans to tackle climate change, this article set out to explore the
ideational, discursive and institutional dynamics through which
this might be observed. Combining DI with a relational deﬁnition
of ideas illustrates how, through discursive interactions, ideas
underpinning institutionalized policy arrangements can be re-
conﬁgured. The impact of these changes on the policy process can
be described as power through, over and in ideas. To summarise the
UK case in these terms: austerity economics proved most
persuasive among policymakers, the non-story status of climate
change kept it away from the (potentially creative) frictions of
politics, and institutional constraints ensured any attempt to
increase climate ambitions were delegitimised. Thus, it has been
shown that ideas continue to matter after the adoption of
innovative policies and that the discursive interactions and
ideational bricolage through which they evolve can be analysed
to reveal exactly when and how they matter.
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transformed from innovative leadership to decentralised respon-
sibility, questioning (and also rejecting) new targets for reducing
emissions in favour of ‘Big Society’ driven alternatives. The
economics of climate change continued to be a prominent
cognitive idea tying together norms, principles and speciﬁc
solutions. However, its previous rationale for early action was
challenged by a shift in emphasis from investment to austerity i.e.
from beneﬁt to cost. Together these reformulated ideas were
represented through increasingly popular discourses of macro-
economic prudence and climate policy scepticism. In addition to
amplifying divisions among political actors these changes
reinforced simpliﬁed narratives and stalled the progress of
climate policymaking through restrictions on both thoughts
and resources.
Contrary to the image of UK climate politics as safely
institutionalised by cross-party agreement and ﬂagship legislation,
the 2010–2015 period was marked by an increasing dissensus.
Some direct impacts on policy were apparent (e.g. in cuts to
department budgets, to renewable energy subsidies and to energy
efﬁciency schemes) although these were obscured under the
general banner of austerity rather than as an effect of the UK
abandoning its position as a climate leader. This is perhaps the
most worrying implication of the ﬁndings, especially for other
countries seeking to emulate the UK’s climate policy framework
and consensual political strategy. Strong disagreement among
policymakers, as well as a growing shortfall in the required policies
to meet long-term targets, were partially hidden from critique.
Thus, target setting and rhetorical commitments may provide
political cover for inadequate policy action on the ground. At the
UNFCCC COP21 in Paris in 2015 the UK, and many other countries,
presented themselves as leading the ﬁght against climate change,
however the gap between targets and implementation at the
national level has been quietly growing.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Kate Lock for her help with
conducting the research and Lucie Middlemiss for her comments
on a previous draft. Gratitude is also extended to the interviewees
who took time to make this research possible and to both the
University of Leeds’ School of Earth and Environment and the ESRC
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy for funding.
References
Andresen, S., Agrawala, S., 2002. Leaders, pushers and laggards in the making of the
climate regime. Global Environ. Change 12, 41–51.
Ares, E., 2011. UK Fourth Carbon Budget: Standard Note SNSC 5966. House of
Commons Library. Available at: http://www.parliament.uk/business/
publications/research/brieﬁng-papers/SN05966/uk-fourth-carbon-budget.
Béland, D., Cox, R.H., 2011. Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research. Oxford
University Press.
BIS, 2013. Better regulation framework manual. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/better-regulation-framework-manual (accessed
26.11.15.).
Bauer, M.W., Knill, C., 2012. Understanding policy dismantling: an analytical
framework. In: Jordan, A., Green-Pedersen, C., Turnpenny, J., Bauer, M. (Eds.),
Dismantling Public Policies: Preferences, Strategies, and Effects. Oxford
University Press, pp. 30–51.
Bauer, M.W., Jordan, A., Green-Pedersen, C., Héritier, A., 2012. Dismantling Public
Policy: Preferences, Strategies, and Effects. Oxford University Press.
Beamer, G., 2002. Elite interviews and state politics research. State Polit. Policy Q. 2,
86–96.
Bell, S., 2012. Where are the institutions? the limits of Vivien Schmidt’s
constructivism. Br. J. Polit. Sci. 42, 714–719.
Bowen, A., Rydge, J., 2011. Climate change policy in the United Kingdom. OECD
Economics Department Working Papers No. 886.
Bows, A., Mander, S., Starkey, R., Bleda, M., Anderson, K., 2006. Living within a
carbon budget. Available at: http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/publications/technical-
report/2006/living-within-carbon-budget (accessed 10.12.15.).Boykoff, M.T., McNatt, M.B., Goodman, M.K., 2015. The cultural politics of climate
change news coverage around the world. In: Hansen, A., Cox, R. (Eds.), The
Routledge Handbook of Environment and Communication. Routledge, pp. 221.
CCC (Committee on Climate Change), 2014. Meeting Carbon Budgets—2014 Progress
Report to Parliament. Available at: http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2014/07/CCC-Progress-Report-2014_web_2.pdf.
Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2010. Building the Big Society. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/building-the-big-society (accessed 25.11.15.).
Cairney, P., 2011. Understanding Public Policy: Theories and Issues. Macmillan,
Palgrave.
Carstensen, M.B., Schmidt, V.A., 2015. Power through, over and in ideas:
conceptualizing ideational power in discursive institutionalism. J. Eur. Public
Policy 1–20.
Carstensen, M.B., 2011. Ideas are not as stable as political scientists want them to be:
a theory of incremental ideational change. Polit. Stud. 59, 596–615.
Carter, N., Jacobs, M., 2014. Explaining radical policy change: the case of climate
change and energy policy under the british labour government 2006–10. Public
Admin. 92, 125–141.
Carter, N., 2014. The politics of climate change in the UK. Wiley Interdiscip. Rev.
Clim. Change 5, 423–433.
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change), 2009. The UK Low Carbon
Transition Plan: National Strategy for Climate and Energy Available at: http://
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100509134746/http:/www.decc.gov.uk/
en/content/cms/publications/lc_trans_plan/lc_trans_plan.aspx (accessed
10.12.15.).
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change), 2011a. Carbon Plan: Delivering
our Low Carbon Future Available at: http://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/the-carbon-plan-reducing-greenhouse-gas-emissions-2
(accessed 10.12.15.).
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change), 2011b. The UK Renewable
Energy Roadmap: 2011, in: Change, D.o.E.a.C. (Ed.). Available at: https://www.
gov.uk/government/collections/uk-renewable-energy-roadmap (accessed
10.12.15.).
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change), 2013. Memorandum to the
Energy and Climate Change Committee Post-legislative Scrutiny of the Climate
Change Act 2008. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
memorandum-to-the-energy-and-climate-change-committee-post-
legislative-scrutiny-of-the-climate-change-act-2008 (accessed 10.12.15.).
DEFRA, 2012. UK Climate Change Risk Assessment: Government Report. The
Stationery Ofﬁce Ltd, London Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/uk-climate-change-risk-assessment-government-report
(accessed 25.11.15.).
Fankhauser, S., Gennaioli, C., Collins, M., 2015. The political economy of passing
climate change legislation: evidence from a survey. Global Environ. Change 35,
52–61.
Farquharson, K., 2005. A different kind of snowball: identifying key policymakers.
Int. J. Soci. Res. Methodol. 8, 345–353.
Fischer, F., 2003. Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative
Practices. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Flyvbjerg, B., 2001. Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How
It can Succeed Again. Cambridge University Press.
Giddens, A., 2009. The Politics of Climate Change. Polity Press, Cambridge, UK.
Gieryn, T.F., 1983. Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-
science: strains and interests in professional ideologies of scientists. Am. Sociol.
Rev. 48, 781–795.
Gofas, A., Hay, C., 2010. The Role of Ideas in Political Analysis: a Portrait of
Contemporary Debates. Routledge.
Green Alliance, 2015. Leaders Joint Climate Change Agreement. Available at: http://
www.green-alliance.org.uk/resources/
Leaders_Joint_Climate_Change_Agreement.pdf (accessed 11.12.15.).
Gummer, J., 2014. UK Climate Policy Since the 2008 Climate Change Act. The
Institute of International and European Affairs Available at: http://www.iiea.
com/events/uk-climate-policy-since-the-2008-climate-change-act (accessed
10.12.15.).
Guston, D.H., 2001. Boundary organizations in environmental policy and science: an
introduction. Sci. Technol. Hum. Values 26, 399–409.
HMRC, 2014. Carbon price ﬂoor: reform. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/carbon-price-ﬂoor-reform (accessed 26.11.15.).
Habermas, J., Lenhardt, C., Nicholsen, S.W., 1990. Moral Consciousness and
Communicative Action. MIT press.
Hajer, M., Versteeg, W., 2005. A decade of discourse analysis of environmental
politics: achievements, challenges, perspectives. J. Environ. Policy Plann. 7, 175–
184.
Hajer, M., Wagenaar, H., 2003. Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding
Governance in the Network Society. Cambridge University Press.
Hajer, M.A.,1996. The politics of environmental discourse. Ecological Modernization
and the Policy Process. Oxford University Press.
Hajer, M., 2009. Authoritative Governance: Policy Making in the Age of
Mediatization. Oxford University Press.
Hall, P.A.,1993. Policy paradigms, social learning and the state: the case of economic
policymaking in Britain. Comp. Polit. 275–296.
Hill, K., 2009. The UK Climate Change Act 2008—Lessons for National Climate Laws:
An Independent Review by ClientEarth. ClientEarth Available at: http://www.
clientearth.org/climate-energy/climate-energy-publications/uk-climate-act-
337 (accessed 10.12.15.).
36 R. Gillard / Global Environmental Change 40 (2016) 26–36Hirschman, D., Berman, E.P., 2014. Do economists make policies? On the political
effects of economics. Socio-Econ. Rev. mwu017.
Hope, M., Raudla, R., 2012. Discursive institutionalism and policy stasis in simple
and compound polities: the cases of Estonian ﬁscal policy and United States
climate change policy. Policy Stud. 33, 399–418.
Howlett, M., 2014. Why are policy innovations rare and so often negative? Blame
avoidance and problem denial in climate change policy-making. Global Environ.
Change 29, 395–403.
Jordan, A., Huitema, D., 2014. Innovations in climate policy: conclusions and new
directions. Environ. Polit. 1–20.
Kütting, G., Lipschutz, R., 2012. Environmental Governance: Power and Knowledge
in a Local-global World. Routledge.
Keohane, R.O., 2000. Ideas part-way down. Rev. Int. Stud. 26, 125–130.
Kern, F., Kuzemko, C., Mitchell, C., 2014. Measuring and explaining policy paradigm
change: the case of UK energy policy. Policy Polit. 42.
Kuzemko, C., 2015. Energy depoliticisation in the UK: destroying political capacity.
Br. J. Polit. Int. Relat. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-856X.12068.
Liefferink, D., Arts, B., Kamstra, J., Ooijevaar, J., 2009. Leaders and laggards in
environmental policy: a quantitative analysis of domestic policy outputs. J. Eur.
Public Policy 16, 677–700.
Lockwood, M., 2013. The political sustainability of climate policy: the case of the UK
Climate Change Act. Global Environ. Change 23, 1339–1348.
Lorenzoni, I., Benson, D., 2014. Radical institutional change in environmental
governance: explaining the origins of the UK Climate Change Act 2008 through
discursive and streams perspectives. Global Environ. Change 29, 10–21.
Noy, C., 2008. Sampling knowledge: the hermeneutics of snowball sampling in
qualitative research. Int. J. Soc. Res. Methodol. 11, 327–344.
Osborne, G., 2011. Conservative Party Conference 2011: George Osborne Speech in
Full. The Telegraph Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/
georgeosborne/8804027/Conservative-Party-Conference-2011-George-
Osborne-speech-in-full.html (accessed 10.12.15.).
Patashnik, E., 2008. Reforms at Risk: What Happens After Major Policy Changes are
Enacted. Princeton University Press.
Patterson, O., 2014. 2014 Annual Global Warming Policy Foundation lecture  Owen
Patterson: Keeping the Lights On. Available at: http://www.thegwpf.com/
owen-paterson-keeping-the-lights-on/ (accessed 10.12.15.).Pawson, R., 2006. Evidence-based Policy: A Realist Perspective. Sage publications.
Peters, B.G., 2011. Institutional Theory in Political Science: the New Institutionalism.
Bloomsbury Publishing, USA.
Pielke Jr., R.A., 2009. The British Climate Change Act: a critical evaluation and
proposed alternative approach. Environ. Res. Lett. 4, 024010.
Pierson, P., 2004. Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis. Princeton
Univeristy Press.
Rogers-Hayden, T., Hatton, F., Lorenzoni, I., 2011. ‘Energy security’ and ‘climate
change’: constructing UK energy discursive realities. Global Environ. Change 21,
134–142.
Sabatier, P.A., 2007. Theories of the Policy Process. Westview Press, Boulder, CO.
Schmidt, V.A., 2008. Discursive institutionalism: the explanatory power of ideas and
discourse. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 11, 303–326.
Schmidt, V.A., 2010. Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining change
through discursive institutionalism as the fourth ‘new institutionalism’. Eur.
Polit. Sci. Rev. 2, 1–25.
Schmidt, V.A., 2011. Reconciling Ideas and Institutions through Discursive
Institutionalism. In: Béland, D., Cox, R.H. (Eds.), Ideas and Politics in Social
Science Research. Oxford University Press.
Schoﬁeld, K., 2013. Get Rid of the Green Crap: PM’s Solution to Soaring Energy
Prices. The Sun Available at: http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/
politics/5275026/David-Cameron-orders-aides-to-cut-green-taxes.html.
Schreurs, M.A., Tiberghien, Y., 2007. Multi-level reinforcement: explaining
European Union leadership in climate change mitigation. Global Environ. Polit.
7, 19–46.
Stern, N., 2007. The Economics of Climate Change: the Stern Review. Cambridge
University Press.
Stratton, A., 2011. Vince Cable and Chris Huhne Clash over Carbon Emissions. The
Guardian Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/may/09/
vince-cable-chris-huhne-carbon-emissions (accessed 10.12.15.).
Voß, J.-P., Smith, A., Grin, J., 2009. Designing long-term policy: rethinking transition
management. Policy Sci. 42, 275–302.
Yanow, D., 2000. Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis. Sage.
